Horizon

To say that we have 'divering' understandings of fairness implies that there was once a commonly recognized definition of the term. As a historical claim I don't believe that's sustainable. Vague aspirational values are always muddy in useage. One of my dissertation chapters is about 'fairness' in political discourse, and the way at one particular time and place it was used to mean umpteen different mutually exclusive things.

Thanks for the link -- very much up my alley.

The definitions ring mostly true to me, though I've got some quibbles. They seem to recognize that a plurality of values motivate people on each side, but sometimes play some fancy footwork in a way that muddies the issue. For example:

The suggestion that the state should be involved in redistributing wealth in pursuit of fairness sets off alarm bells for conservatives, just as the notion that government working to increase opportunities for those who have too few strikes conservatives as taking from the upstanding in order to help the undisciplined obtain undeserved gains.

The first sentence rings entirely true to me. "Redistribution of wealth" as an end goal of society gives me the heebie-jeebies. (It doesn't as a means to some other end, but that's another conversation.) However, "government working to increase opportunities for those who have too few" is only objectionable to an individualist if "opportunities" uses their (fairly bizarre) "progressive" definition including "ensuring health care." They do this a few times in the paper, switching the progressive definition of a value for the conservative one mid-sentence.

A few other quibbles:

The state intervenes only in cases of threats to the moral order, such as criminal or immoral behavior or foreign attack. The overarching conservative prescription for the state is preservation of the moral order: hence, marriage restrictions, abolishment of the endangered species act, and the “three strikes” law.

The term "moral order" is problematic for me here, as it seems to imply that the ranking of the three duties of the state in conservatives' minds is reversed from what I suspect it is. Leaving aside the phrase "marriage restrictions," it seems like the typical conservative here would prefer Rick Santorum's social agenda to a strong military if offered a choice. Maybe poor phrasing, but still off-base.

They also never explain how the Endangered Species Act threatens the moral order, which leads me to my next quibble:

For conservatives, opportunity has only to do with individual initiative: opportunities are all around, and if an individual fails to achieve the desired goal, it is not for want of opportunity but for want of initiative and discipline.

Halfway right. Opportunity does have to do with individual initiative and should have access to the rewards it has earned, but conservatives recognize that it can also be restricted unfairly. Probably like liberals, they prioritize different types of restrictions on opportunity, but prioritize them differently. Conservatives worry most about individual iniative being thwarted by man-made acts of force -- by other states and by criminals most typically. Law being applied by force, conservatives then worry about governmental regulation that narrows the possibilities for an individual to maximize their opportunity -- which is where opposition to environmental regulation originates. Further down this heirarchy of worry are other, less controllable things, like acts of nature or accident of birth, which can also rob initiative of its fruits. So I'd argue that with those caveats, conservatives would agree that "the existence of opportunity necessitates that the state use its power to help remove those obstacles when possible."

Finally, their conclusion seems to be pretty thoroughly garbled. After explaining that the same words mean different things to different people, they suggest You can do this by substituting the referenced value with a different one more in accordance with your worldview (“This isn’t a question of individualism, it’s a question of fairness”). This won't work at all in a debate about something like affirmative action, because the conservative will think you incomprehensibly redundant, and you won't have explained your position to anyone not already sharing your worldview.

On the other hand, the advice: Or, you can accept the value being used to characterize the issue, but define it within the context of your view of the world (“My opponent is right, this is a question of fairness: what’s fair in this situation is for people not to be penalized for their life circumstances”). seems to follow perfectly from the article.

On the other hand, the advice: Or, you can accept the value being used to characterize the issue, but define it within the context of your view of the world (“My opponent is right, this is a question of fairness: what’s fair in this situation is for people not to be penalized for their life circumstances”). seems to follow perfectly from the article.

I agree, this is probably true, in the sense of being an expedient tactic; but I wonder if the original writer is honest enough with himself to recognize that this could be shortened to say: or, you can use spin.

The real test of an honest rhetorician is supposed to be be whether he can give an account of his opponent's position that would be acceptable to that opponent. I would say that this article scores half points; it makes a genuine stab at describing the world from the conservative's point of view, but is misleading enough to lead its intended (progressive) reader into error.

Hmmm, following on from that, this is the site's comment on 'Framing versus Spin':

"Every word comes with one or more frames. Most frames are unconscious and have just developed naturally and haphazardly and have come into the public's mind through common use. But, over the past 40 years, conservatives — using the intellectuals in their think tanks — have consciously and strategically crafted an overall conservative worldview, with a conservative moral framework. They have also invested heavily in language — in two ways:

- Language that fits their worldview, and hence evokes it whenever used. "Tax relief" is a good example.

- Deceptive language, that evokes frames they don't really believe but that public approves of. Saying "Tax relief creates jobs" is an example — or referring to their environmental positions as being "clean," "healthy" and "safe."

The Rockridge Institute advises against the use of deceptive language and we will not engage in it. We believe that honest framing both accords with progressive values and is the most effective strategy overall.

Whether or not this is a historically accurate account: isn't the impugning on your opponent's motive the classic ad hominem distraction? Maybe 'tax relief' creates jobs or maybe it doesn't, but arguing that your opponent doesn't really believe in his case anyway just encourages you to not really think about yours. As any Jesuit could presumably tell you, the cogency of an argument has (or ought to have) little to do with the character of who's making it. The author's line between 'honest' framing and 'dishonest' spin seems to depend mainly on whether he's the framer/spinner or not.

I would be interested to know what you think about the Rockridge Institute, Martha, as I'm guessing (perhaps wrongly) that despite posting the original link you have your reservations about its tactics.

If these very mild and reasonable bits of public relations coaching strike you boys as "bizarre" and "garbled" and impermissibly "ad hominem," I fear the likes of Molly Ivins would be too much for your delicate gaskets.

The Rockridge folks do consider their opponents' political philosophy to be fundamentally immoral, and it's not improper for them to say so. Moral language is unavoidably part of politics, and there's nothing saying that progressives, alone among the American political groups, have to take morally couched condemnations in the teeth -- and from moral paragons like Tom DeLay, too -- without delivering any of their own in response.

Alan seems especially disturbed by the failure of the Rockridge people to label what they do as propaganda. But the document pretty clearly is advice on producing successful propaganda -- at least it's more honest about its intentions than a lot of the persuasive documents you see with a label at the top saying "Fact Sheet."

A more interesting question, I think, might be whether there is a difference between good political speech and propaganda -- or, to put it differently, between good political speech and marketing -- and if so in what such a difference consists.

Martha, I wish you'd read my comment on its own, rather than through the lens of Alan's intemperate rantings. Regardless, I'm going to try to address some of both your points in a series of tiny little comments. Apologies if the format is unruly.

"Bizarre" and "Garbled" were yours, Ben. Dunno, doesn't seem like anyone's being intemperate here. Cranky, yes. (Me, too.) But not intemperate.

Alan writes:

I agree, this is probably true, in the sense of being an expedient tactic; but I wonder if the original writer is honest enough with himself to recognize that this could be shortened to say: or, you can use spin.

I completely disagree. You may call it spin to try to try to find reasons for someone else to support your policies that you do not share yourself, but it's how our democracy has worked. You advance a policy (say, freeing the slaves under Confederate controle) by finding diverse reasons for people to support it (military efficacy / the first step to full emancipation), not by subjecting all your potential political allies to a test of purity of motives.

For example, let's assume that my pal Liberal Democrat Academic Andrew opposes the plans for privatizing social security for a bevy of leftish reasons ranging from "the stock market is a shell game" to "I oppose anything advocated by the regime that seized power in a bloodless coup." I mention that I oppose the plan on the libertarian grounds that involving the government directly in the stock market is a Very Bad Thing, leading to Japan-like situations where politicians promise to raise the Dow Jones in order to get elected.

The next time Andrew is discussing the subject with someone of libertarian sympathies, should he trot out my libertarian objection to privatization, or would that be "spin"? Is it only legitimate for Andrew to use the reasons that originally animated him in his rhetoric, or is he permitted to appeal to the many reasons for people unlike himself to oppose the idea?

One of the things I find so frustrating among a certain section of the grassroots left is a refusal to look for common ground with people of conservative sympathies. It seems like they agree with you that ideological purity requires an advocate to refuse to tarnish their brain with understanding how their opponents (or the broad middle) thinks, even if only to understand how to persuade them. The Rockridge paper does precisely the opposite -- it seems to be an honest attempt to explain how conservatives think, the better to appeal to them. As such I applaud it.

Martha, I wish you'd read my comment on its own, rather than through the lens of Alan's intemperate rantings.

?? (I'm hoping that a dry humor is at work here).

Alan seems especially disturbed by the failure of the Rockridge people to label what they do as propaganda. But the document pretty clearly is advice on producing successful propaganda.

I don't agree. The 'Framing versus Spin' section is obviously an attempt to draw a moral line between the tactics the RI is proposing (framing=good) and those of its opponents (spin=bad), a division which is itself a creation of spin.

You may call it spin to try to try to find reasons for someone else to support your policies that you do not share yourself, but it's how our democracy has worked.

Perhaps I didn't make it clear enough to begin with, but I don't think spin is in and of itself all that wicked. My beef is simply with the idea that the RI is not spinning but 'framing', a distinction I find completely arbitrary.

Alan writes: "it makes a genuine stab at describing the world from the conservative's point of view, but is misleading enough to lead its intended (progressive) reader into error."

I disagree. It's nowhere near as off-base as the psycho-garble touted by Lackoff with his "Strict Father/Nurturant Parent" stuff, as it encourages its readers to engage with conservative values and ideas rather than performing childhood regression therapy upon them. In other words, it advocates converting and winning instead of feeling superior and losing.

I figure it's about 80% right on its portrayal of conservatives, and the places where its ideology colors its description are more window dressing (i.e. "marriage restrictions") than systamic and misleading. In its perscriptions for engaging and converting conservatives, it makes two — one of which seems completely inconsistent with its thesis, while the other holds weight, even if you think it tantamount to "spin."

And Martha, like it or not, an argument that your opponent is wrong because insincere is by definition ad hominem.

Alan, I gather you're talking about this document over here? If so, they seem to be saying that their opponents are outright dishonest whereas their own recommendations call for rhetorical calculation rather than dishonesty. Whether you agree with them is another question, but the distinction they're making, if adhered to, is real.

...and that's as far as I go. Nothing personal, but I can't really spare the moral energy to argue this into the ground with you today.

Alan, just saw your last note. Seems to me if your opponent is lying, and you call him a liar, that's a legitimate and frequently a necessary move in politics. You're quite welcome to call it an ad hominem if you like.

The author's line between 'honest' framing and 'dishonest' spin seems to depend mainly on whether he's the framer/spinner or not.

It seems we're talking about three different types of argument:

Arguing a point you believe to be true and that motivates you,

Arguing a point you believe to be true but that does not motivate you,

Arguing a point you do not believe to be true

The second may be insincere, but the third is lying,

Martha, I retract "bizarre". It may well be that progressives[*] understand the leaps between having an active welfare state and individuals being able to acheive opportunity without needing them spelled out, and this was just shorthand.

I stand by "garbled", however. The thesis of "many values are undefined or underspecified, their meanings shifting depending on the speaker and situation" seems to necessitate the kind of strict definition they suggest in their second presecription. I have no idea how using the same words your opponent has just used without that sort of contextualization or specification is going to win debates.

Again, thanks for the article. I really do enjoy this sort of thing, and not only because it fits with my politics. There's a certain kind of narcissistic thrill to reading accounts of outsiders who don a pith helmet in go exploring in your own backyard. This is probably the political equivalent.

Alan, just saw your last note. Seems to me if your opponent is lying, and you call him a liar, that's a legitimate and frequently a necessary move in politics. You're quite welcome to call it an ad hominem if you like.

Since the truth of the proposition is assumed in its premise, you could substitute anything for 'lying' and 'liar' in the above; buffoon, bigot, whatever the slur of the day is. It's still a strategy of distraction rather than engagement, and therefore from a rhetorical point of view contemptible. To find it elevated to the status of virtue I find odd.

As for sincerity; quite apart from the impossibility of judging it, what difference does it make to the truth value of what one has to say? Should an attorney's argument be disregarded because he is making it for pay rather than because of his emotional attachment to the cause?

I'm surprised to find so avid an Orwell reader arguing that it's unseemly to call a liar a liar. In your opinion, then, what is the proper quantity of an opponent's dishonesty one ought to swallow before using the "l" word, or may one properly use it at all?

Regarding lawyers, the point you raise is in fact precisely the reason why lawyers are barred from claiming personal knowledge of the facts of a case if they are serving as advocates, and why, at trial, lawyers may not serve both as advocates and as witnesses before the same jury. A lawyer is generally a paid advocate (though as I know bitterly, that's far from always true), and consequently the facts, as opposed to the argument, must be established from sources other than the lawyer.

I'm surprised to find so avid an Orwell reader arguing that it's unseemly to call a liar a liar.

You've missed my point, Martha. There's an important difference between saying that something is wrong and calling someone a liar - as the Speaker of the House of Commons could tell you.

Important political differences are rarely resolveable by an appeal to simple factual data - they're aither arguments about abstract values (freedom, equality, justice) or complicated enough that it's the prioritization of data which matters most (which facts are more important?). In such cases accusations of lying are rarely even relevent, let alone seemly. By suggesting that its opponents frame 'dishonestly' - that they are liars - the RI is engaged in a strategy of distraction intended to draw a false distinction between what they do and what others do.

As I've said, I have no objection in principle to framing, but let's not pretend that there's any real difference between it and spin; 'framing' is itself a framing of spin.

I would add that I think the opponents of Mr. Bush's Iraq policy damped the force their own case by focussing on his 'lying' about prewar intelligence rather than on the way it was handled - so that the issue became one of his personal conscience rather than the effective and responsible use of information. If you encourage people to think of their opponents as not simply wrong but maliciously wrong then you tempt them into these sorts of errors, which IMHO are not only tactically unwise but also deleterious to public culture.

A depressing example of the 'liar, liar' tendency in politics today can be found in the comments boxes of our esteemed net neighbour Harry's Place, in which rarely do two or more reader posts appear before someone's pants are alleged to be on fire.

What this boils down to I think is Orwell's observation that people can rarely imagine their opponents to be simultaneously sincere and intelligent.